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BALANCING LOCAL CONCERNS
WITH CERCLA POLICIES: THE IMPORTANCE OF
PERSPECTIVE IN CONSIDERING THE APPLICATION
OF FEDERAL MANDATES
State of Missouri v. Independent Petrochemical Corporation'
by Eric Walter
I. INTRODUCTION
The decision in State of
Missouri v. Independent Petro-
chemical Corporation follows a
series of lawsuits by the United
States against Syntex (USA), Inc.,
Syntex Agribusiness, NEPACCO,
IPC, Russell Martin Bliss, and
Jerry-Russell Bliss, Inc., pursuant to
the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act ("CERCLA").2 The aim
of this consolidated litigation,
known for limited purposes as the
Missouri Dioxin Litigation, was to
seek remedial relief and recovery of
response costs for the release of
dioxin and other hazardous materi-
als during the early 1970s at twenty-
eight sites in eastern Missouri, most
notably Times Beach.'
Pursuant to this litigation,
the parties entered into two Consent
Decrees which authorized the clean-
up and outlined the required safety
standards.4 St. Louis County
("County"), which includes Times
Beach, sought more stringent envi-
ronmental standards for the Syntex
Consent Decree and appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit.s The County
petitioned the Court to acknowl-
edge their rights and privileges
under the Syntex Consent Decree.
The County cited as error both the
denial of its motion to intervene and
the district court's ruling on the
construction and enforcement of the
Syntex Consent Decree.'
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Eleven years ago, the
Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") issued a Record of
Decision ("ROD"), which found
that a form of incineration called
thermal treatment would be the
most appropriate clean-up remedy
at Times Beach and other dioxin-
contaminated sites in Missouri.'
Within the ROD, the EPA an-
nounced the "applicable or relevant
and appropriate .requirements"
("ARARs") related to this clean-up
procedure, as required by
CERCLA.8 Syntex, the EPA, and
'104 F.3d 159 (8th Cir. 1997).
'Id. at 160. See also City of Eureka, Missouri v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 500, 502 (Mo. E.D. 1991). CERCLA was amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). Hereafter, reference toCERCLA is intended to include the amendments
made by SARA.
'Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d at 160. For the purposes of this Note, there are two groups of defendants: the Syntex
defendants ("Syntex"), consisting of Syntex (USA), Inc. and Syntex Agribusiness; and the NEPACCO defendants ("NEPACCO"),
consisting ofNortheastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Company, Inc. (NEPACCO); NEPACCO's president, Edwin Michaels, and its
vice-president, John Lee; Independent Petrochemical Corporation (IPC); Russell Martin Bliss, the individual who actually sprayed the
dioxin-contaminated waste oil at the 26 sites in Missouri; and Jerry-Russell Bliss, Inc., Bliss' successor in liability. United States v. Bliss,
667 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (Mo. E.D. 1987) (hereinafter, "Bliss I"). The specific roles these entities played in the contamination will be
detailed further in this Note.
'Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d at 160.
3Id.
*Id.
7Id. A "record ofdecision" is defined as the EPA's official record of the entire remedy or remedial action, as defined under § 101 ofCERCLA
and publicly reviewed under § 117 ofCERCLA, including the ARARs. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1995); 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1995). The actual
clean-up procedure is outlined in the National Contingency Plan. 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1995). The Plan provides that after a hazardous site
has been identified, anEPA evaluation will determine whether remedial action is appropriate. See United States v. Denver, City and County
of, 100 F.3d 1509(10 Cir. 1996). This evaluation includes feasibility studies to identify the possible remedial alternatives. Based on those
studies, the EPA proposes the selected remedy and allows for public comment. Following this, the clean-up plan is then finalized, and the
EPA documents its remedy decision in a record of decision (ROD).
* Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d at 160. A complete definition is provided for "Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate
Requirements" in a Directive from the EPA's Office ofSolid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER): "' [a]pplicable' requirements are
those clean-up standards ofcontrol, and other substantive environmental protection requirements, criteria, or limitations promulgated under
federal or state law that specifically addressa hazardous substance, pollutant, contaminant, remedial action, location, or other circumstance
at a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, andLiability Act(CERCLA)site. 'Relevant and appropriate' requirements
are those clean-up standards which, while not 'applicable' at a CERCLA site, address problems or situations sufficiently similar to those
encountered at the CERCLA site that their use is well-suited to the particular site. ARARs can be action-specific, location-specific, or
chemical-specific." OSWER, "Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund: Volume I - Human Health Evaluation Manual (Part C, Risk
Evaluation ofRemedial Alternatives)," 1991 WL 645477 (December 1991).
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the State of Missouri entered into a
Consent Decree patterned after the
ROD and its ARARs.9 The Consent
Decree described the clean-up
procedures in five workplans, one
of which was the Thermal Treat-
ment Workplan.' 0 The Consent
Decree also required that Syntex
apply for a Hazardous Waste
Management Permit from the EPA
and the State of Missouri to
construct and operate the incinera-
tor."
In July 1993, a draft EPA/
Missouri Hazardous Waste Man-
agement Facility Permit was issued
to Syntex which proposed a formula
establishing the levels of dioxin and
metal emissions that would not
exceed health and environmental
laws." The Permit's risk assess-
ment found that the clean-up could
be conducted safely using a
standard of approximately one
nanogram of dioxin per dry
standard cubic meter of air." This
effectively constituted a one in one
million chance of the most heavily
exposed person developing can-
cer.14
In February 1995, shortly
after the hearings concerning the
draft Permit, the St. Louis County
Council voted to amend its Air
Pollution Control Code." The
amendments raised the air emis-
sions permit standards for any
incinerator intended to burn known
concentrations of dioxin.'6  The
only incinerator in St. Louis County
subject to the new standard was the
incinerator at Times Beach." The
new standard was approximately
six times more restrictive than that
approved by the EPA and the State
of Missouri."' Despite this new
requirement, the final EPA/Mis-
souri Permit, issued two months
after the County ordinance was
passed, retained the original stan-
dard. '9
Syntex filed a motion
requesting clarification of obliga-
tions under the Consent Decree in
light of the County's amended
ordinance.2 0 The County filed a
motion to intervene either as of right
or permissively.2' The District
Court rejected intervention as of
right, but permissive intervention
was effectively granted since the
County was allowed to file a brief in
opposition to Syntex's motion to
construe.22 Pursuant to these
proceedings, the District Court
declared that the County ordinance
did not apply to the Times Beach
project and limited the scope of the
ordinance to "control of conven-
tional air pollutants, not including
dioxin."23 The decision meant that
the parties to the Consent Decree
were exempt from the County
ordinance's amendments.24
On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit found that the nature of
hazardous waste clean-up was not
given to continual modification,
and that such modification would
thwart the Congressional mandate
for expeditious treatment of toxic
sites.2 - Further, the Court held,
federal law requires that ARAR's
be frozen as of the date of the ROD,
and that the workplans revealed no
intent by the parties to ignore that
proposition.6 The Eighth Circuit
9Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d at 160.
10 Id.
" Id. Although in no way required to do so under § 121 (eX 1) ofCERCLA, Syntex agreed in the Consent Decree to apply for air, water and
hazardous waste permits to construct and operate the thermal treatment unit, including a St. Louis County Department of Health air
construction/operating permit. Id. at 162. The County bases its argument that Syntex must comply with the County's new ordinance on this
clause. Id.
"1Id. at 161. (The determination of the appropriate level of emissions was based on a site-specific Times Beach Risk Assessment of this
incineration project.)
1 Id.
"Id. (The decision offered no information on why one nanogram ofdioxin per dry standard cubic meter ofair equated with the project being
conducted "safely." It only stated the fact in a conclusory manner, that "safely" was the standard the EPA and the State ofMissouri defined







22Id. (The decision did not explain why the motion to intervene as ofright was rejected by the district court. The Court only explained that
whatever the reason, an error would have been harmless given the fact that the County had the opportunity to present its position regarding
Syntex's motion to construe and effectively was heard.)
2 Id.
24 I
2 Id. at 162. See also 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(1XiiXBX I); 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8757 (1990).
2 Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d at 162.
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held that due to the federal
government's involvement in the
project, the County's amended
ordinance was inconsistent with
federal law and thus, inapplicable to
the Times Beach project.
III. LEGAL BACK-
GROUND
Dioxin is a unique and
harmful substance and has been the
subject of extensive study and
research.28  A by-product of
combustion and other industrial
processes, its physical and chemical
properties predispose dioxin to
exist primarily in soil, sediments,
and living things.2 9  Studies have
shown dioxin to be one of the most
potent animal carcinogens ever
tested.30  While dioxin's effects
vary depending on the particular
strain of the chemical, there are
effects common to most forms.3 1
Experimental exposure to low
concentrations of common dioxins
has produced varying degrees of
cancer, adverse effects on immune
and male reproductive systems, and
most commonly, chloracne. 32 Sci-
entists have generally agreed that
human data is too limited, leading
them only to conclude that dioxin is
a "probable" human carcinogen
under some conditions of expo-
sure.33
Despite the scientific un-
certainty surrounding dioxin's harm-
ful effects, the EPA elected to
regulate dioxin emissions to protect
human health and the environ-
ment. 34 Critics of these regulations
have argued that the stringent rules
are overly cautious, while others
have sought more restrictive regula-
tion.35 In addition, supporters of
increased regulation suggest the
elimination of all chlorinated or-
ganic compounds that do not
readily degrade into harmless
substances.36 For the time being, the
EPA is awaiting new scientific
evidence before modifying its
dioxin regulations." Unfortu-
nately, the EPA's regulations came
too late for some communities that
were knowingly exposed to dioxin.
A. Factual Background
Hoffman-Taff, Inc.,
chemical company located in
Verona, Missouri, manufactured
Agent Orange for the Vietnam War
effort in the late 1960s." A dioxin-
laden residue, which the plant
stored in large drums, was a by-
product of the process used to
manufacture Agent Orange.39
Syntex, Inc., acquired the rights and
liabilities of Hoffinan-Taff, effec-
tive December 31, 1968, and
subsequently transferred those in-
terests to Syntex Agribusiness.40 In
the early 1970's, Northeastern
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Com-
pany ("NEPACCO") moved into
the Verona plant and began manu-
facturing trichlorophenal ("TCP"),
which also produced dioxin as a by-
product. This additional dioxin was
added to the waste left by Hoffman-
Taff." NEPACCO sought to
dispose of these wastes, so it
retained Independent Petrochemi-
cal Corporation (IPC).42  Ulti-
mately, IPC hired Russell Bliss to
perform the disposal, which Bliss
did by mixing the by-products with
waste oil and other substances and
spraying the mixture at a number of
" Id.
2 Linda-Jo Schierow, Dioxin: Reassessing the Risk, 7 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT 7, 8 (1996). See also William B. Johnson,
Liability Under § 7003 ofResource Conservation and Recovery Act Pertaining to Imminent Hazards from Solid or Hazardous Waste,
115 AMERICAN LAw REPORTS FEDERAL 491 (1993).29 Schierow, supra note 28, at 8.
*0 Id. United States v. Vertac Chemical Corporation, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. 20709 (1980). Experiments which involved painting a dioxin
mixture on mice caused tumors to appear on the animals' skin. See Environmental Protection Agency, Chemical, Physical, andBiological
Properties ofCompounds Present at Hazardous Waste Sites, 1985 WL 263592 (1985).
3n Id. at 630.
n Id. Chloracne is a severe skin disorder marked by painful symptoms that can persist for long periods of time. Jamon A. Jarvis, Note, The
Discretionary Function Exception and the Failure to Warn ofEnvironmental Hazards: Taking the "Protection " Out ofEnvironmental
Protection Agency, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 543 (1993). Extreme cases can lead to the development of disfiguring lesions. Arnold W. Reitze,
Jr. & Andrew N. Davis, Comment, Regulating Municipal Solid Waste Incinerators Under the Clean Air Act: History, Technology and
Risks, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (1993).
3 Schierow, supra note 28, at 8.











sites in eastern Missouri.43
Health concerns over di-
oxin and TCP contamination have
been warranted at twenty-eight sites
due to this spraying.44 The EPA has
in fact determined that several of
these sites, most prominently Times
Beach, contain levels that create a
potentially imminent and substan-
tial danger.45 The result has been a
series of consolidated litigation to
resolve liability and determine the
appropriate method of clean-up.'
B. Litigation
Aside from insurance li-
ability cases and personal indem-
nity suits, there have been four
significant cases stemming from the
factual situation outlined above.
The first case involving the dioxin
contamination of Times Beach was
aimed at establishing primary
liability for the environmental
damage. 48
In United States v. Bliss
("Bliss I"), the United States sought
a determination of liability against
NEPACCO under section 107 of
CERCLA for damage to natural
resources and expenses associated
with response costs and remedial
action. 49 The government motioned
for summary judgment against each
defendant for the contamination
resulting from their common inter-
est in disposing of the Verona plant
by-products, arguing that the fact
that Bliss physically sprayed the
dioxin mixture did not excuse the
other defendants.50
Prima facie liability under
CERCLA requires four elements:
(1) each of the sites is a "facility";
(2) a "release" or a "threatened
release" of a "hazardous substance"
from the sites has occurred or is
occurring; (3) the release or
threatened release has caused the
United States to incur response
costs; and (4) the defendants fall
within at least one of the classes of
liable persons described by sections
107(a)(1)-(a)(4).s' Since CERCLA
provides for strict liability, a
defendant's prior knowledge or
intent is not an issue." The three
defenses to CERCLA liability are:
(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war;
or (3) an act or omission of a third
party.s" Since the defendants failed
to present any evidence supporting
any one of the defenses, and the
government successfully established
a prima facie case of CERCLA
contamination, the District Court
found NEPACCO jointly and
severally liable.54
In United States v. Bliss
("Bliss II"), the United States
District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri heard motions
by the cities of Eureka and Fenton
(the Cities) to intervene and file
complaints against Syntex and
NEPACCO.ss The Cities sought
intervention to express their con-
cern over the possible adverse
effects of using nearby Times
Beach as a locus for the area's
dioxin clean-up.-6 The Court
determined that the relevant re-
quirements for intervention as of
right were listed in 42 U.S.C. §
4 1 Id. During the early 1970's, Bliss was receiving oil from over a thousand sources, primarily crankcase oil from service stations. Oil was
placed into and drained from two large storage tanks at Bliss' facility in Frontenac, Missouri on a daily basis. Most of the oil was loaded
onto tanker trucks and taken to oil refineries, but some was sprayed at the contaminated sites for dust suppression. Bliss 1, 667 F. Supp. at
1303 (Mo. E.D. 1987).
" Bliss III, 133 F.R.D. at 561.
4 Id.
" Id.
4 SeegenerallyBliss I, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (Mo. E.D. I987, United States v. Bliss, 132 F.R.D. 58 (Mo. E.D. 1990) (hereinafter, "Bliss II");
Bliss I, 133 F.R.D. 559 (Mo. E.D. 1990); City of Eureka v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 500 (Mo. E.D. 1991).
4 Bliss 1, 667 F. Supp. at 1302.
49 Id. at 1304. Section 107 ofCERCLA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
so Bliss 1, 667 F. Supp. at 1303.
Id. at 1304. A "facility" is defined as "(A) any building, structure,...pipe,...pond,...vehicle,...or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored,...or otherwise comes to be located." 42 U.S.C. §9601(9). CERCLA defines a "release"
as "any spilling, leaking, pumping,.. .dumping, or disposing into the environment [any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant]
(with exceptions). See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). A "hazardous substance" is defined in § 101 of CERCLA as including toxic pollutants,
hazardous air pollutants, and hazardous chemical substances or mixtures. For a complete and detailed listing, see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)
5 Bliss 1, 667 F. Supp at 1304.
3 d.
54 Id
-5 Bliss II, 132 F.R.D. 58 (Mo. E.D. 1990). (Eureka is approximately two miles from Times Beach and Fenton is located within ten miles
of Times Beach.)
56 Id. at 59.
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9613(i) (CERCLA) and subject to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24." Regarding the timeliness of
the application, the Court found that
the Cities' application was untimely
in light of the broad media coverage
and considerable pendency of the
consolidated cases."s The Court
found it was unreasonable to
believe the Cities were unaware of
the significance of the case or the
prior opportunities to be heard on
the issues.59
The Court ruled that the
Cities need not achieve party status
to have their interests represented.6o
The Court further concluded that
workplans contained in the Consent
Decree, which included the EPA's
recommendation of Times Beach as
the center of the clean-up effort,
would be published, and any
interested party, including the
Cities, would have an opportunity
to submit written comments to the
Department of Justice.6' In addi-
tion, the Court stated, government
entities exist to act in the public
interest, so there was a presumption
that Missouri and the United States
were adequately representing the
Cities' interests.62 The Court held
that this presumption, along with
the available forms of public
participation, sufficiently protected
the Cities. Moreover, had these
parties failed to adequately repre-
sent the Cities' interests, the Court
stated that it could have permitied
intervention upon a showing of bad
faith or malfeasance on the part of
the government entities."
United States v. Bliss
("Bliss III"), involved the District
Court's review of the two Consent
Decrees, one signed by Syntex and
the other by NEPACCO. 6s The
proposed Consent Decrees, if
approved by the Court and the
parties, would have resolved all
pending issues in the consolidated
cases concerning the Syntex and
NEPACCO defendants." The
Court praised the Syntex Consent
Decree and the workplans con-
tained within it as exhaustive,
detailed, and commendable.6' The
public, on the other hand, submitted
comments on the Consent Decrees
which indicated a profound concern
for potential hazards, such as
contaminated smoke emanating
from the incinerator or flood waters
carrying dioxin to other areas in
Missouri and possibly farther.'
After reviewing the provisions
regarding Times Beach and the
thermal incinerator, the Court
indicated that it believed the
public's sentiments were the prod-
uct of unfounded anxiety.' In
particular, the Court noted the
explicit timetable, and the sizable
penalties associated with failure to
adhere to the specifications of the
Consent Decrees.7 0
The NEPACCO Consent
Decree provided that the defendants
" Id. The elements under these statutes require a potential intervenor to: "(1) make a timely application for intervention; (2) have an interest
in the subject of the action; (3) be so situated that without intervention, the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or
impede the applicant's ability to protect this interest, and; (4) have an interest not adequately protected by existing parties." 42 U.S.C. §
9613(i).
"'Bliss II, 132 F.R.D. at 60. At the time of the trial, the EPA's Record of Decision was almost two years old and the Cities had participated
in many of the state and federal processes addressing both the dioxin problem and its litigation. In addition, since the town ofTimes Beach
was forced to evacuate due to the contamination, this factual situation had been a topic of media coverage for several years. Id.
"
9Id. To illustrate one such opportunity, the Director of the Department ofNatural Resources discussed intervention with the Cities' counsel,




6 1 d. at 61.
I Id. The Eight Circuit has applied this standard, as promulgated by the Supreme Court: "[biad faith or malfeasance on the part of the
Government in negotiating and accepting a consent decree must be shown before intervention will be allowed." United States v. Associated
Milk Producers, 534 F.2d 113,117 (8th Cir. 1976) (quoting Sam Pox Publishing Co. V. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961). See also
United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984), an enforcement action in which the government sued as "paren
patriae." The Court of Appeals found that, "it is proper to require a strong showing of inadequate representation before permitting
intervenors to disrupt the government's exclusive control over the course of its litigation." Id. at 987.
6 Bliss III, 133 F.R.D. at 559. At the time these were signed, no liability had attached to Syntex. Id. at 562.
" Id., at 562.
7 Id.
"Id. at 563. Times Beach is located in the five-year flood plain of the Meremac River. The Consent Decree required the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers to erect a ring levee around the incinerator three feet higher than the 100 year flood height.
" Bliss III, 133 F.R.D. at 563.
o Id. The Court also pointed out the logic in selecting Times Beach as the site of the incinerator. Not only is "Times Beach the largest of
the twenty-eight sites in both geographic size and volume of contaminated waste," it would not be feasible tobuildan incinerator at each site.
Some of the sites would not be large enough to house such a facility. Also, Times Beach is a logical choice because it has already been
evacuated. Id. at 564.
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would pay the plaintiffs $225,000.00
within thirty days of the entry of the
Consent Decree." This payment
acted in discharge ofthe NEPACCO
defendants' entire liability for the
incident.7 2 Part IV of the Consent
Decree protected NEPACCO with a
discretionary covenant not to sue,
but also included a means to reopen
the case should new information
reveal the need for further remedial
action to protect human health,
welfare, and the environment."
Finally, the Court explored
the legal standards governing entry
of Consent Decrees and made
findings of fact and conclusions of
law.7 4 The Court has discretion in
approving a consent decree, but that
discretion is limited, in that rejec-
tion must be due to "unfairness,
inadequacy, or unreasonableness.""
The judge should be concerned only
with the adequate protection of the
parties and the public, not the
optimal terms of settlement. 6
In determining whether a
consent decree should be approved,
the Court applied a rubric first
offered by the First Circuit." The
rubric's four elements are (1)
procedural fairness, (2) substantive
fairness, (3) reasonableness, and (4)
fidelity to the statute."' An
evidentiary hearing on the suitabil-
ity of a consent decree was
available, but as the First Circuit
noted, courtrooms are busy, and a
hearing should be held only when
oral argument is necessary.' 9
The Court found that no
evidentiary hearing would be neces-
sary because all relevant issues were
fully argued and thoroughly
briefed. 0 Specifically, each of the
four elements of the rubric indi-
cated that the Consent Decree
should be approved and entered.'
The successful application of the
rubric and the Court's perception of
the facts and Consent Decrees
compelled the judge to grant the
joint motion of the United States
and Missouri to enter the Consent
Decrees between those government
entities and the Syntex and
NEPACCO defendants."
Finally, nearly eight months
after the decision in Bliss III , the
cities of Eureka and Fenton,
Missouri, brought an action to
challenge the EPA's selection of a
remedial action plan prior to the
plan's implementation.' The
defendants, the United States and
the EPA, moved to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction."
They argued that under 11 3(h)(4) of
CERCLA, no affirmative chal-
lenges to an EPA response action
plan could be made prior to
implementation, effectively remov-
ing the case from the limited
jurisdiction of the federal courts."
The Court began by re-
viewing the thorough and public
procedure employed by the EPA to
arrive at its clean-up decision. 6
Pursuant to these efforts, the EPA
issued a ROD recommending
centralized thermal treatment of
71 Id. at 566.
72 Id.
7 Id. The opinion also included comments from non-settling defendants. This group includes Independent Petrochemical Company,
American National Can Company, and Primerica Corporation. They argued that the Syntex Consent Decree left too much liability on them,
recommended ultraconservative clean-up procedures, and was not consistent with the National Contingency Plan. Id. at 566-67. (This
portion of the decision is not relevant here).
I Bliss III, 133 F.R.D. at 567.
7 1 Id. The Ninth Circuit provided in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Randolph that: "[tihe initial decision to approve or reject a
settlement proposal is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge... Unless a consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable,
it ought to be approved." Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (91 Cir. 1982).
7 6Bliss III, 133 F.R.D. at 567.
n Id. at 568 (citing United States v. Cannons Engineering Corp., 899 F.2d 79(1 Cir. 1990)).
" Cannons Engineering Corp., 899 F.2d at 86-93.
9Bliss III, 133 F.R.D. at 568.
0 Id. at 569.
"I Id. The Court found that negotiations between all the parties had been characterized by arm's length relations and good faith.
Consequently, procedural fairness was accomplished. Substantive fairness was a more difficult element to meet. The Court determined,
though, that the consent decree "falls along the broad spectrum of plausible approximations," so it should not be judicially disturbed or
second-guessed. Id. Next, the Court held that not only the cost apportionment, but also the clean-up procedure and workplans sufficiently
satisfied the element ofreasonableness. Finally, fidelity to CERCLA was evident in the appropriate obligation ofthe settling defendants and
the accountability of the responsible parties for their environmental misdeeds. Id. at 570.
8 Id.
* City ofEureka, 770 F. Supp. at 501. The plaintiffs acted under section 310 of CERCLA. Id.
1 Id. The motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is Rule 12(bX1) of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure.
U City ofEureka, 770 F. Supp. at 501.
6 Id. The EPA's efforts began in 1982. Id. The EPA conducted feasibility studies on both Times Beach and an area known as the Minker/
Stout/Romaine Creek site. Id. These studies were released independently to the public and comments were received for periods of several
months. Id. In addition, public meetings were held where interested citizens could offer viewpoints and have concerns addressed. Id. Only
after all these activities were concluded, and the comments considered and responded to, did the EPA select a remedy for the ROD. Id.
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contaminated soils at the temporary
facility at Times Beach." The ROD
formed the basis of the plaintiffs'
challenge. 8
The United States argued
that CERCLA completely prohib-
ited pre-enforcement or pre-imple-
mentation review of remedial
actions taken by the EPA pursuant
to CERCLA." Consequently, the
defendant contended that the plain-
tiffs' claims were premature.90 The
Court found for the United States,
stating that federal judicial review
was not available when the remedial
plan was chosen but had not been
"taken" or "secured". 91 The Court
concluded that the opinions sup-
porting the plaintiffs argument
were inconsistent and not on point,
and dismissed the claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.92
C. Federal Preemption
The existence of CERCLA
and other federal hazardous waste
or pollution regulations has led to a
great deal of litigation regarding
whether control of remedial selec-
tion is vested in the federal, state, or
local government, or some combi-
nation thereof.9 3 Section 121(d)(2)
of CERCLA outlines the level of
input and control granted to the
states in this process.94 Any state
standard that is more stringent than
the federal standard, and which a
state has identified to the President
in a timely manner, is legally
applicable or relevant and appropri-
ate under the circumstances of the
release or threatened release.95 By
the conclusion of the remedial
action, the level of control for the
hazardous substance must be equal
to or greater than the state
standard.96
However, the state's role in
the remedial selection is not
immutable.97  Subsection (d)(4)
grants the President the power to
violate subsection (d)(2) if the
President finds one of six circum-
stances to exist.9" Examples of such
circumstances a greater risk of
human health resulting from com-
pliance with the state standards, and
the technical impracticability of
compliance with the state standards
from an engineering perspective.99
In the event the President finds one
of these circumstances to exist, the
state standards and requirements
may be disregarded.'"
The state does have another
avenue of relief for enforcement of
its standards.' 0' If the President
proposes a remedial action plan
inconsistent with state regulations,
the proposal must toll thirty days
before it can be entered into a
consent decree.'02 This thirty day
grace period allows the state to
decide whether to concur in the
selection. 03 If the state concurs, the
state has the opportunity to become
a signatory to the consent decree.10
Should the state elect to not
concur in the President's selection,
preferring a remedial action plan
conforming to its own standards,
87 Id.
* Id. at 502. This action was in response to the unsuccessful attempt by the parties to intervene on an earlier action for the purpose of
challenging the ROD's approval by the court. Id. The judge in that action denied the parties on both their initial motion and on
reconsideration. Id.; See also Bliss II, 132 F.R.D. 58 (Mo. E.D. 1990).
" City ofEureka, 770 F. Supp. at 502. The defendants offered a wealth of case law in support of their contention that section 11 3(hX4) of
CERCLA explicitly prohibits pre-implementation review of such remedial actions. Id.
9 Id.
"Id. Section 113(h) ofCERCLA reads in relevant part: "No Federal court shall havejurisdiction under Federal law...to review challenges
to removal or remedial action selected... except... (4) An action under section 159 alleging that the removal or remedial action taken under
section 104 or secured under section 106 of CERCLA was in violation of any requirement ofthis chapter. Such an action may not be brought
with regard to a removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the site." Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
' City ofEureka, 770 F. Supp. at 503.
"See generally City and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1996); IdylwoodsAssociates v. MaderCapital, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1290(W.D.N.Y. 1996); Chatham Steel Corp. v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
'42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1995). Interestingly, the statute does not mention anymeasuresofcontrol applicable to governmental entities besides
the state level. Evidently, the Congressional intent was to exclude county and municipal laws to achieve efficiency. As the instant decision
mentions, these smaller governmental units can petition their state to represent their wishes. hadependentPetrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d
at 159 (8th Cir. 1997).
"42 U.S.C. § 9621(dX2XA).
"Id.
"42 U.S.C. § 9621(dX4).
*Id.
"Id. For a complete list of the six situations in which the President may ignore state standards in selection of remedial action, see 42 U.S.C.§962l(dX4XA)-(F).
10 Id
o'42 U.S.C. § 9621(f).





the state has two choices.o One
option is intervention as a matter of
right, in which the state could
attempt to show that the President's
findings were not supported by
substantial evidence"5 6 If the court
rules for the state, the remedial
action shall be modified to conform
with the state's standards, and the
state may become a signatory to the
decree.' 0' If the court determines
that the remedial action need not
conform to the state's standards, the
state can choose to pay the
additional costs necessary to com-
ply with the state's standards, in
which case the state shall become a
signatory to the decree."
There have been many
cases litigated on interpretation of
this facet of CERCLA. Primarily,
the dispute has revolved around
whether federal law preempts the
state law, absent some statutory
provision protecting the state law.'"
Generally, the rule is that if
the federal law does not have clear,
preemptive language, the court
must consider whether Congress
intended to preempt state law."10
Courts have ruled, "an intent can be
found where the scheme of federal
regulation is so pervasive that it is
reasonable to assume that Congress
has left no room for supplementa-
tion by the states.""' In Witco
Corporation v. Beekhuis, the Dela-
ware District Court faced a preemp-
tion issue.1 2 Delaware had a state
non-claim statute, requiring that
claims against a decedent's estate be
made within eight months of the
decedent's death."3 On the other
hand, CERCLA provides that
claims for contribution may be
made for three years after the date of
the judgment or judicially approved
settlement." 4
Federal courts have found
in many cases that Congress, in
enacting CERCLA, did not intend
to explicitly preempt all state
environmental law."s In addition,
these courts have agreed that
CERCLA is not so comprehensive
as to preclude supplementation by
the states."'6  However, it is
undisputed that federal law pre-
empts any conflicting state law."'
Thus, the Witco Court found two
relevant inquiries regarding pre-
emption: (1) Is it possible to
comply with both laws?; and (2)
does state law stand as an obstacle
to the intent of Congress?."'
Regarding the first ques-
tion, the Delaware court found that
it was possible to comply with both
statutes." 9 This could be accom-
plished by giving the estate notice
of a contingent claim and filing a
contribution action within the three




"See IndependentPetrochenical Corp., 104 F.3d at 159; Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 822 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Del. 1993). In United States
v. Akzo Coating ofAmerica, Inc., the Court provided three instances when preemption can occur, stating: "(1) When Congress, while acting
within constitutional limits, preempts state law by stating so in express terms; (2) When the federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive
to make it reasonable to infer that Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation; and (3) In areas where Congress has not
completely displaced state regulation, federal law may preempt state law to the extent that the state law actually conflicts with the federal
law." United States v. Akzo Coating ofAmerica, Inc., 949 F.2d 1409(6* Cir. 1991). The first situation is commonly referred to as "express
preemption," while the second is known as "field preemption." City and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d at 1509. In City andCounty ofDenver,
the Court noted a fourth example of preemption, "conflict preemption," which occurs where it is impossible to comply with both the federal
and state laws, or the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's objectives. Id.
"oSee Witco, 822 F. Supp. at 1084; Akzo Coating ofAmerica, Inc., 949 F.2d at 1409.
' Witco, 822 F. Supp. at 1088.
12Id.
"1Id. at 1087. The statute, 12 Del. C. § 2102, states in relevant part: "All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death
of the decedent.. whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort or other legal
basis... are barred against the estate, the personal representative and the heirs and devisees ofthe decedent unless presented as provided in§ 2104 ofthis title within eight (8)months ofthe decedent's death whether or not the notice referred to in § 2101 of this title have been given."
Id.
"1 Id. at 1088. CERCLA § 11 3(gX3) provides in pertinent part: "No action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be
commenced more than three (3) years after... (A) the date ofjudgment in any action under this Act for recovery of such costs or damages,
or.. .(B) the date of .. entry ofajudicially approved settlement with respect to such costs or damages." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(gX3) (1995).
115 Witco, 822 F. Supp. at 1088.
"' Id.
"' Id. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI,cl. 2; State Department ofHealth v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1994). Preemption is deemed to exist (1)
when compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or (2) where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Witco, 822 F. Supp. at 1088.
"' Witco, 822 F. Supp. at 1088.
It 9Id.
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year limitation provided in
CERCLA.120  For the second
question, the Court found that the
state statute did stand as an obstacle
to the intent of Congress, in that one
of the policies behind the federal
law is to force responsible parties to
bear the cost and obligation for
remedying the harmful conditions
they created.' 2' Moreover, two
district courts have held that state
non-claim statutes stand as an
obstacle to Congress' intent in
enacting CERCLA.122
The Witco Court rejected
these prior decisions and found that
CERCLA does not preempt state
law in this area.'23 First, since the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
govern CERCLA, the Court found
that Rule 17(b) gives the states the
exclusive power to pass laws
relating to the capacity of a person
to sue or be sued.124 Therefore, state
capacity statutes, like the Delaware
non-claim statute, may not be
preempted by CERCLA.12s
A second argument against
preemption involved the probate
nature of the Witco case. 2 6 Obvi-
ously, a deceased person would not
experience the same deterrent effect
and sense of responsibility for
environmental damage.'27 In addi-
tion, states have traditionally had a
strong interest in the prompt
settlement of its residents' es-
tates.'3 8 Thus, the Court found that
since Witco knew it was being
investigated as a potentially respon-
sible party before the decedent
passed, the corporation could have
notified the Beekhuis estate of
Witco's contingent CERCLA con-
tribution claim. 2 1 Witco's failure
to do so did not change the Court's
finding that the non-claim statute
was the true barrier to CERCLA
preemption. 3 0
Witco is a rare case, in that
state law prevailed over federal law.
In most cases, the result is similar to
the one in United States v. City and
County of Denver."' In that
decision, the EPA and the Colorado
Department of Health (CDH)
issued a proposed remediation plan
for a site known as OU-VIII, which
identified excavation and replace-
ment of contaminated soils as the
preferred alternative.'3 2 However,
the plan also encouraged public
comment on all seven feasible
alternatives.' 3  Following this
input, the EPA and CDH issued a
ROD reflecting the public support
for on-site solidification of the
contaminated soils. 134
However, when the respon-
sible party attempted to begin the
on-site remedy, Denver issued a
cease and desist order based on
asserted violations of the city's
zoning ordinances. 3 s After nego-
tiations with Denver failed, the
United States sought a declaratory
judgment finding the cease and
desist order void and unenforce-
able.'36 The district court granted
the United States' motion for
summary judgment based on the
Supremacy Clause. 13' Among the
possible forms of preemption, the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit found that the instant
variation was "conflict" preemp-
tion.3 As Denver conceded, the
120 ld.
121 Id. at 1088-89.
I Id. at 1089. Essentially, these cases held that to the extent state law purports to release responsible parties from liability for releasing
hazardous wastes into the environment, CERCLA preempts state law.
"n Witco, 822 F. Supp. at 1089.
124 Id.
'2 Id.
26 Id. at 1090.
127 Id.
12s Id.
129 Id. at 1091.
' Id.
"' 100 F.3d 1509 (10" Cir. 1996).
'
2 Id. at 1511. The contamination in Denver was the result of exposure to radioactive waste in the early 1900's. Id. The entire Superfund
site was divided into eleven operable units comprising over forty locations. Id. The site at issue, known as OU-VIII, consists of three parcels,
the largestofwhich is the only privately-owned unit in the entire Superfund site. Id. It is owned by S.W. Shattuck Chemical Company, the
responsible party. Id.
1' Id.
1" Id. Denver expressed support for excavation and replacement, but did not claim that onsite remediation would violate its zoning
ordinances. Id. at 1512.
US Id. The zoning ordinances prohibit the maintenance of hazardous waste in areas zoned for industrial use. Id.
' Id.
u7 Id. The Court noted that its review of this decision was de novo, and applied the standard that, "Summaryjudgment is appropriate if 'there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and...the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law."' Id. See also FED. R. Civ.
P. 56(c).
"n City and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d at 1512. See also Witco. 822 F. Supp. at 1088, for discussion of the forms of preemption.
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responsible party could not possibly
comply with both the local zoning
ordinances and the EPA's remedial
order.'3  Denver offered two
arguments against preemption. 40
First, Denver suggested
that Congress did not intend to
preempt local zoning ordinances.'4 '
Its argument was that since CERCLA
includes an express preemption in
section 121, Congress would have
expressly provided for any other
appropriate means of preemp-
tion.'4 2  Denver claimed that a
Supreme Court case, Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., stood for the
proposition that an implied preemp-
tion cannot exist where Congress
has included an express preemption
elsewhere in the statute. 43
The Tenth. Circuit found
Denver's interpretation of Cipollone
erroneous. 44 The Court's reading
was that implied preemption is
precluded by an express preemption
clause only if that clause offers a
"reliable indicium of congressional
intent with respect to state author-
ity".'4 1 In fact, the Court found two
federal cases stating that an express
preemption provision does not
necessarily preclude the possibility
of implied preemption or an
analysis for its presence.146 Conse-
quently, the Court found that the
express preemption clause in sec-
tion 121 did not qualify as a
sufficiently reliable indicium of
Congress's intent.' 4 Moreover, the
Court suggested that a contrary
holding would conflict with
CERCLA's policy goal of prompt
and efficient clean-up of hazardous
waste sites.' 4
Second, Denver argued that
its zoning ordinances constituted "a
state environmental or facility siting
law." 4 9 If this had been the case, the
ordinance would have fallen within
the definition of "applicable or
relevant and appropriate require-
ments" of state law, requirements
which the EPA must comply with
when the state requirements are
more restrictive than the federal
standards.'" Denver reached this
conclusion relying on Wisconsin
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, a
Supreme Court case finding that the
use of the term "state" in a portion
of a federal statute included
"political subdivisions" of the
state. 5'
The circuit court decided
that Mortier did not apply in this
situation because it would produce a
result contrary to the policy
objectives and legislative history of
CERCLA.s 2 The Court based its
holding on the fact that the
applicable federal statute inMortier,
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA'),
unlike CERCLA, did not empha-
size in its legislative history the
prompt and efficient remediation
attending issues relating to public
health.'13 Essentially, the decision
held that had Congress intended to
define "state law" as including local
zoning ordinances, it would have
expressly done so, and thus, the
ordinances were preempted.'s4
These cases provide ex-
amples of the interplay and relation-
ship between federal law and state
and local laws. As Witco demon-
strates, federal law does not always
supersede state and local law.
However, the Supremacy Clause
dictates that federal law will usually
preempt state and local law, as
evidenced by City and County of
Denver and the instant decision.
City and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d at 1512.
oId. at 1513.
41Id.
'4 Id. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
'"City and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d at 1513.
15Id.
'6Id. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995), Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir. 1996).
141 City and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d at 1513.
18Id.
19Id.
"' Id. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenorv. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597(1991). The statute at issue inMorrier was the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 -13 6(y) (1995).
"I City and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d at 1513.
153Id.
"1 Id. The remainder of this decision regards Denver's challenges to the EPA's chosen remedy. Id. The Tenth Circuit rejected these
challenges on the basis of§ 113 ofCERCLA, which provides that no federal court shall havejurisdiction toreviewany challenges to removal
or remedial action selected by the EPA under § 104 or §106(a) ofCERCLA. Id. at 1514. There are five exceptions to this provision, but
Denver did not argue that any are applicable to these facts. Id. The Congressional policy behind § 113 is to prevent protracted litigation
interfering with CERCLA's overall goal of effecting the prompt clean-up of hazardous waste sites. Id.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
Circuit Judge Ross wrote
the opinion in State of Missouri v.
Independent Petrochemical Corpo-
ration for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.'
As a threshold matter, Judge Ross
set out the applicable standards of
review.'" When reviewing the
district court's interpretation of a
consent decree, the appellate court
will apply Missouri's rules of
contract interpretation."' The court
will exercise de novo review if the
interpretation is based entirely on
the written instrument.'58  If the
interpretation is also based on
extrinsic evidence, however, the
court will apply clearly erroneous
standard.' The court noted that a
consent decree is a unique form of
law, a private agreement between
parties subject to the interpretation
of the court.'" Consequently, a
court interpreting a consent decree
must consider the context in which
the decree was signed.' 6' The
Eighth Circuit noted that the
District Court that entered the
decree had a superior perspective,
stating that the District Court's
interpretation would receive defer-
ence.162
The District Court's denial
of the County's motion to intervene
as a matter of right was not given
formal treatment by the Eighth
Circuit.' 6' The Appellate Court
ruled that even if the District Court
erred in denying the motion, it was
harmless error, not reversible error,
since the lower court allowed the
County to present its arguments
regarding Syntex's motion to con-
strue.'" Thus, the County was
heard and had no cause to
complain.' 6s
The County's primary ar-
gument was that the parties to the
Consent Decree agreed that Syntex
would be required to obtain a
county permit.'" Under section
121(e)(1) of CERCLA, federal law
does not require a local permit for
any onsite removal or remediation
action.'16  However, Syntex did
agree to obtain the necessary waste
permits to construct and operate the
Thermal Treatment Unit.'" Under
the agreement, the County claimed
authority to impose their more
restrictive air emissions standards.169
The District Court found
that the County's argument was
well-supported by the Consent
Decree, except that federal law
mandates that all related ARARs
are "frozen" as of the date the ROD
is issued.7 0 The ARARs may be
changed after that date, but only if
the EPA finds that "new standards
are necessary to ensure that the
remedy is protective of human
health and the environment."' 7'
This regulatory requirement was
included in the Consent Decree and
Thermal Treatment Workplan, along
with the parties' agreement that
Syntex apply for County air and
pollution permits. 7 2
The court stated that the
EPA's policy for "freezing" ARARs
is based on efficiency."'7  If the
ARARs were not given a measure
of consistency, the EPA would
constantly be modifying the rem-
edies and standards in light of new
or different requirements.17 4 Conse-
quently, such an outcome would
slow the clean-up operation and
defeat Congress's mandate of
quick, effective clean-up of hazard-
ous sites.s75
The District Court found
that the EPA was not required to
adhere to the County's stricter
standard.'76 Pursuant to its research,
the EPA determined the appropriate
standards, and there was no





















evidence outside the County's
ordinance and claims which indi-
cated the EPA's determination was
inaccurate."' The Court concluded
that the EPA knew of the County's
more restrictive standard but elected
to ignore that standard in the Final
Permit.I" In fact, by excluding the
stricter standard, the EPA implicitly
rejected it as necessary for the
protection of human health and the
environment.' 9
The County argued that,
despite federal law operating to
freeze the ARAR's on the date the
ROD is issued, the Consent Decree
reserved the County's right to
impose stricter dioxin standards
after the ROD was issued in
September, 1988.1so The Court
found that the Thermal Treatment
Workplan included a limited agree-
ment by the parties that Syntex
would apply for County air emis-
sion permits.' 8' However, that
agreement specifically mentioned
only conventional pollutants, which
does not include dioxin.'8 2  The
Court implied that the provision
could have received broader treat-
ment, but in light of the County's
heavy, unexpected reliance, the
Court felt compelled to limit the
provision to its literal interpreta-
tion.'
The Court also found
nothing in the workplans to indicate
an intent by the parties to modify or
waive federal law regarding ARARs
being frozen on the date of the
ROD.'84  The agreement did not
grant the County power to modify
the ARARs, which were fixed when
the ROD was issued.8 5 The only
means of modifying the ARARs
was to convince the EPA that an
alteration was necessary for human
health and the environment.'86
The Court concluded by
noting that the County could have
asked Missouri to request a higher
standard regarding dioxin emis-
sions in 1988 when the ROD and
ARARs were being issued.' The
County knew of the project, yet
waited some seven years to amend
the ordinance, long after the
standards had been established.'88
The Circuit Court found that the
County's higher air pollution "stan-
dards were insufficient to overcome
the clear federal law" on this
issue.'8 9 The Court held that the
County's ordinance regarding di-
oxin emissions was inapplicable to
the Times Beach project because
once the EPA published ARARs
and the ROD, they became federal
law, and thus, preempted inconsis-
tent local law.' 9
V. COMMENT
This case offers an interest-
ing perspective on the struggle
between the patriarchal federal
government and the narrowly inter-
ested local governments. Who
should decide what level of
protection is sufficient for families
living and working near Times
Beach, Missouri? On the one hand,
the federal government possesses
nearly endless experience, knowl-
edge and resources. However, local
governments are comprised of the
citizens who will be left behind after
the clean-up is over. Would the
experts in the EPA issue the same
ARARs if their children were
attending nearby Eureka High
School? This note does not suggest
that the federal government is not
equally concerned with the safety of
Americans throughout the country.
The issue involves comparing the
ability and interest of government
officials with the interests of Joe Q.
Public in the resolution of environ-
mental contamination.
The instant decision is
rather unique, in that very few cases
have involved ordinances on the
county or municipal level conflict-
ing with federal CERCLA opera-
tions.' 9' There is, however, a great
body of precedent concerning
preemption questions between state
law and federal law.'" The Witco
case offers the relatively rare
situation of a state law preempting a







'8 Id. at 162-63.
'" Id. at 163.
189 Id.
" See City and County ofDenver, 100 F.3d 1509; Idvlwoods Associates, 915 F. Supp. 1290; Chatham Steel Corp., 858 F. Supp. 1130.
9 Id.
"I Witco, 822 F. Supp. at 1084.
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will generally be limited to issues
involving profound state interest or
public policy concerns. The instant
decision clearly stays within the
realm of environmental law domi-
nated by federal legislation, and
thus, the state law is preempted.' 94
Express preemption obvi-
ously leaves nothing for the courts
to decide. In terms of implied
preemption, the District Court in
Witco offered two relevant inquir-
ies, both of which resolve conflicts
by preempting the state law.' 9s With
exceptional situations such as the
one in Witco, courts have found that
a state's compelling interest in an
area of law warrants denying
preemption for a relatively weak
federal interest.' 9
The policy underlying the
EPA's decisions are derived prima-
rily from CERCLA. While forcing
responsible parties to bear the cost
of remedial action, the EPA must
also refrain from excessive clean-up
costs.' 9 Therefore, the EPA's goal
is to apply the quickest, most
efficient, most reasonable means of
remediation at Superfund sites.'"
On the other hand, the
County's policy is also compelling.
Its constituents living in the County
fear the adverse effects an ill-
conceived clean-up effort could
produce.'" Consequently, the
County has an incentive to seek a
more restrictive standard for these
chemical emissions. In cases like
these, where the local government
cannot represent the people's inter-
ests, the citizens are not simply
bereft of alternatives. The citizens
can utilize public participation.200
As a threshold matter, it is
important to distinguish between
"citizen suits" and "public partici-
pation" under CERCLA. 20' For a
citizen suit, a plaintiff files a civil
suit in a district court against any
potentially responsible person or
governmental entity (to the extent
permitted under the lI1 Amend-
ment to the United States Constitu-
tion), alleging the person or
governmental entity violated "any
standard, regulation, condition, re-
quirement, or order which has
become effective pursuant to this
chapter. "202 A second form of
citizen suit entails filing a complaint
against the President or any other
officer of the United States.203 The
complaining party alleges a failure
to perform any act or duty under this
chapter which is not at that person's
discretion. 20 4
Those avenues consume
both time and resources. Public
participation differs from citizen
suits, in that it does not involve a
legal action.2 0s Public participation
is the means by which citizens living
in and around the contaminated site
can join in the study and selection of
an appropriate remedy.2 *
There are numerous public
policies served by encouraging and
facilitating public participation.
Community empowerment is one
benefit offered by public participa-
tion.207  When a community
discovers it has become a hazardous
waste site, the sense of impotence
can be mitigated by allowing the
people to provide input on the
decision. 20 Direct public involve-
ment helps ease the community's
feelings of helplessness. 209
A second policy advanced
is legitimacy. 2 0 The Superfund has
not enjoyed overwhelming success
in its clean-up efforts, and this has
led to distrust. 211 In addition, the
government has demonstrated no
ability to prevent hazardous waste
' See Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d at 159.
'" Witco, 822 F. Supp at 1088. As discussed in the legal background supra, the two inquiries are, (1) Is it possible to comply with both
statutes?, and (2)Does the state [Delaware non-claim] statute stand as an obstacle to Congressional intent? Id.; see supra text accompanying
note 117.
'" Witco, 822 F. Supp at 1089. The Witco Court declared prior to finding implicit federal preemption, "courts must consider the federal
scheme of legislation, the role ofthe states in that scheme, and whether the field oflegislation is one in which the federal interest is so dominant
that it precludes enforcement ofstate laws on the subject" Id. Thus, where state law has traditionally dominated a field of law, courts should
be particularly reluctant to find preemption. Id.
" 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1995).
55 Fed. Reg. 8814.
'"Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d at 161.
20042 U.S.C. § 9617(1995).
142 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (1995).2 Id.
203 Id.
4 Id.
- 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1995).
2o Id.
I Ellison Folk, Public Participation in the Supesfund Cleanup Process, 18 ECOLoGY L.Q. 173, 181 (1991).
208 Id.
2 Id. at 182.




contamination, and this further
damages the public perception of
the government's ability to clean up
hazardous sites.212 This situation is
aggravated by the appearance of
impropriety attending the close
cooperation between the govern-
ment and the perceived enemy, the
potentially responsible party(s). 213
Public participation addresses these
problems, in that studies have
shown people are generally more
willing to accept decisions in which
they have contributed. 214  While
citizens cannot participate in ways
unavailable under CERCLA, such
as attempting to intervene in
decisions on the submission of
Consent Decrees and enacting
more stringent regulations on a
local level, citizens can exert
considerable influence on the rem-
edy selection.
In the absence of public
participation, the EPA and its
experts generally tend to make
adequate remedial decisions, and
Times Beach is no exception.
While sympathizing with the mo-
tive of the County and its citizens,
the EPA's standard is probably
more than sufficient. The standard
creates a one in a million risk of the
most heavily exposed person devel-
oping cancer. 215  In fact, the
National Contingency Plan does not
permit the EPA to set a more
stringent standard at a Superfund
project.216 The federal government
does not want to jeopardize
American lives. The EPA's
primary concern seems to be the
effective remediation of Superfund
sites without requiring the respon-
sible parties to pay huge amounts to
alleviate the illogical anxiety which
consumes local communities.2"
The instant decision is
based primarily on the idea that
CERCLA and Congress mandate
expeditious clean-up of hazardous
sites.21' Evidence of this policy can
be found in section 113 of
CERCLA, which precludes judicial
review of an EPA remedial order
until after the remedy has been
completed.219 The logic supporting
this holding is that damage to the
environment cannot be enjoined by
a court while litigation is pending.
The state can influence the deci-
sions regarding remediation under
section 121 of CERCLA as
discussed supra, and local govern-
ments can express their concerns
through the state's channels.220
Thus, once an appropriate, not
perfect, remedy has been found and
approved, the issue should be put to
rest. The Court does not want to
open a new avenue of litigation
which would interfere with these
policies.
This decision sends a clear
message to municipal, county and
state governments. If those govem-
mental entities wish to be heard on
remediation issues, the federal
government would be pleased to
hear from them. If those govern-
mental entities remain silent, though,
the federal government will jump in
with both feet and orchestrate the
whole clean-up. There are only two
requirements for the local govern-
ments to assert their interests in the
remedial action plan. First, the local
governments must follow CERCLA
protocol and petition the state
government to express their con-
cerns. Second, the state must
provide all its input before the EPA
determines ARARs and publishes a
ROD. 22 1 Requiring less would
defeat the most integral of CERCLA
policies.
VI. CONCLUSION
As early as 1982, the EPA
had initiated a response program
designed at reducing the contamina-
tion at Times Beach and the other
sites in eastern Missouri. 22 2 The
whole incident enjoyed tremendous
media coverage, especially the
evacuation of the residents of Times
Beach.2 23 The County must have
been aware that a clean-up opera-
212 d
213 1Id.
"I Id. at 180.
... Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d. at 161.
216 Id.
21 A recent news article stated that blood tests had revealed that during the first four months of the incinerator's operation in Times Beach,
the average dioxin concentration in the residents living near the facility had dropped from 1.81 to 1.24 parts per million. Blood Tests Reveal
Times Beach bncinerator is Relatively Safe So Far, West's Legal News, 1996 WL 649533.
21 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8757 (1990).
21942 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1995).
22. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104 F.3d at 163.
221 Note, arguments could be made that efficiency suggests removing the intermediary and the state, and allowing the local governments to
petition the EPA directly. While that may make sense in some or even most cases, such an approach would prove detrimental ifmultiple
governmental entities offered differing perspectives. The administrative costs, in both time and money, could be tremendous. Considering
the state's fiduciary duty to the local governments within its borders, the superior approach would seem to be to allow all interested
government entities to present their viewpoints to the state, which could sort out the arguments and then provide the EPA with a
comprehensive representation of local concerns.
222 See Bliss 1, 667 F. Supp. 1298.
2 1 See Bliss II, 132 F.R.D. 58.
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tion would eventually take place.
At that time, the County should
have begun contemplating what
safety standards would be necessary
to protect the health and welfare of
its citizens, and then conveyed those
beliefs to the Missouri government.
Instead, the County was content to
watch the federal goverrnent
clean-up the Superfund site with no
mention of the proposed remedial
plan. The Court responded by
choosing to perpetuate CERCLA's
policies of swift and efficient clean-
up by dismissing the County's
amended ordinance as a preempted
speed bump on the Superfund road
to remedial relief for Times Beach.
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FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ONLINE SOURCES
EPA HOME PAGE
http://www.epa.gov/epahome/index.html
EPA CIVIL CASES AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
http://www.rtk.net/www/data/docgen.html
EPA PERMIT CONTROL SYSTEM FOR WATER PERMITS
http://wwvw.rtk.net/wvww/data/pcsgen.html
EPA ACCIDENTAL RELEASE INFORMATION PROGRAM
http://www.rtk.net/www/data/aripgen.htmi
CERCLA SUPERFUND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
http://www.rtk.net/www/data/cer-html
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE HOME PAGE
http://www.fws.gov/fwshomep.htnl
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE ENDANGERED SPECIES
HOME PAGE
http://www.fws.gov/-r9endspp/enspp.html




* Missouri State Government Home Page
http://www.state.mo.us
* Missouri Department of Conservation Home Page
http://www.state.mo.us/conservation
* Missouri Department of Natural Resources Home Page
http://www.state.mo.us/dnr/homednr.htm
* Missouri Department of Health Home Page
http://www.health.state.mo.us
* Missouri Department of Public Safety Home Page
http://wwwv.dps.state.mo.us
